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Abstract-Free-loading (to be distinguished from free-riding) is a context-dependent emergent phenomenon that arises when an individual benefits disproportionately from an interaction relative to the other participant(s) of the interaction.
We study the phenomenon of free-loading at three levels: (i) its emergence as a dominant interaction strategy at the individual level; (ii) its occurrence in spontaneously formed dynamic collectives or 'teams'; and (iii) its dominance at the global systemic level. For each of these three levels, we determine the effects of initial network topology on free-loading rate. The topologies considered include (i) random networks with uniform neighbourhood sizes; (ii) similarity networks with uniform neighbourhood sizes in which each agent's neighbours are also the most similar to the agent (both cost-benefit and resources are considered); (iii) Barabasi-Albert networks with power-law distributed neighbourhood sizes; (iv) Non-uniform networks generated with preferential attachment according to similarity. We also consider associations between free-loading rate and other factors such as group size (at the group level) and group membership (at the agent level).
In our network-based model, agent-group interactions represent spontaneous team (collective) formation between a set of agents. At each point in time, the sets of agents participating in collectives is selected depending on the relative costs and benefits of interaction to potential members. Heterogeneity is modelled by differences agents' cost and benefit parameters, which also determine the payoff values for participating in a group interaction. For each agent-group interaction, a payoff matrix is dynamically generated as a function of the agent's cost and benefit parameter values and the collective's cost and benefit parameter values.
We find that initial network topology and connectivity significantly affect the free-loading rate at all three levels (systemic, group and agent) and that free-loading rates at one level are not always coupled to free-loading rates at another. For example, it was found that the Barabasi-Albert network topology gave rise to groups tending to have comparatively lower rates of free-loading at the global and group levels but comparatively higher rates at the agent level. The different topologies also result in different linear associations between group size and free-loading at the group level, and between neighbourhood size and free-loading at the agent level. Our findings provide the basis for studying more fundamental relationships between network topologies and free-loading.
I. INTRODUCTION
The exploitation of group resources by an individual is a pervasive phenomenon in social, economic, and biological collectives. In this study, we focus on the phenomenon of freeloading in dynamically formed collectives or teams, where a team member benefits disproportionately from interaction with the team. This can emerge even without individuals actively seeking to exploit the team, simply because their contributions turn out to be relatively small when compared to other members. For example, in a collaborative team with members working on a common project, there are often discrepancies in the member contributions to the project output simply because members differ in their contributive capacity with respect to the project. Whereas significant progress has been made in understanding and controlling free-riding, where an individual deliberately seeks to exploit the collective (e.g. [1] , [2] ), the more general emergent phenomenon of free-loading has been largely neglected.
A. Primary, secondary and tertiary level interaction strategies: Free-loading versus free-riding Within the game-theoretic framework, we define primary level interaction strategies to be those which can be expressed by a cell in a single payoff matrix, which might represent phenomena such as cooperation, competition, and defection. Secondary level interactions are then defined as those which require two or more payoff matrices. An example of this is the phenomenon of free-riding, when an individual deliberately seeks to maximise his gains in an interaction at the expense of the other interaction participants and succeeds (in socialeconomic contexts, this often equates to cases where individuals obtain benefits from a system without contributing e.g. [3] , [4] ). Whether or not his defective action was a free-riding one depends on whether the other interaction participants have lost or gained less as a consequence of his defection; this requires us to consider the payoff matrix values of all the interaction's participants.
In contrast to both primary and secondary interaction strategies, which depend on which payoff matrix cell is chosen, freeloading can occur with any cell choice simply through differences in payoff for the interaction participants. Furthermore, in interactions involving more than two individuals and/or which require more than one transaction, it can be difficult to predict which individual ultimately benefits the most.
As a tertiary level interaction strategy, free-loading is defined context-dependently in terms of the relative rather than absolute costs and benefits of an action to an individual compared to the relative costs and benefits to the other individuals in the group or system when observed at some level (see Section III for formal definitions of the measures).
The implication of this definition is that an individual can free-load even when he is choosing the most 'charitable' cell in the payoff matrix (e.g. contributing a large proportion of his resources), simply because his contribution in an interaction is dwarfed by the more able or 'wealthier' individuals in the system. From the systemic point of view, the benefit that individual would gain from the system would be larger relative to that gained by his wealthier neighbours. Also, given this definition, a system might exist in which all individuals are contributing and benefiting but where the contribution:benefit ratio of some individuals is far higher than others. Similarly, in a system in which all individuals are defecting, free-loaders are those whose defection is more detrimental to the system than is the defection of other members. In other words, the measure of free-loading used in this study is one that captures system imbalance in cost-benefit. However, it should also be pointed out that if an individual chooses to free-ride, he will necessarily also be free-loading at the interaction level since his strategy involves his benefiting relative to the interaction's other participants (though when the scope considered is increased, it is possible that he will not be free-loading).
In this study, we determine the effects of initial network topology on free-loading at the three different levels: (i) its emergence as a dominant interaction strategy at the individual level; (ii) its occurrence in spontaneously formed dynamic collectives or 'teams'; and (iii) its dominance at the global systemic level.
B. Interactions as games
A major question in the study of complex self-organising systems is how such interaction strategies arise in heterogeneous populations [5] . The adoption of game-theoretic frameworks have proved to be analytically fruitful and, more recently, these have been combined with network and agentbased simulation methods to yield further insights [6] . These have also been extended to multi-player interactions [7] . The model used in this study is similarly based on the gametheoretic framework in that the outcomes of interactions are represented in terms of payoff matrices. In our model however, payoff matrices are calculated dynamically based on functions applied to certain context-dependent parameters.
C. Networks as an abstraction of physical, social and virtual space Graphs and networks have been extensively used to represent and study self-organising complex systems because both entities and relationships are explicitly represented. This is important because by definition, complex systems have dynamic structure [8] . The sensitivity of complex systems to initial conditions can also be expressed (at least partially) in network terms. The initial topology of a graph, which can also be seen to represent the relative locations of a system's entities, can result in great divergences in the system's evolutionary trajectory [9] . The model used in this study is formulated in network terms such that relationships between agents are explicitly represented, and participation in multiple collectives by a single agent is modelled as overlapping hypergraphs [10] .
D. Outline of the paper
The remainder of the paper will be organised as follows:
• Section II introduces the agent-based network model of dynamic team formation used in this study.
• Section III defines measures of free-loading at individual, collective and systemic levels.
• Section IV presents the findings of the study and analyses the effects of network topology on free-loading at the three different levels.
• Section V discusses the findings and proposes further studies based on our findings.
• Section VI summarises and concludes the paper.
II. MODEL OF DYNAMIC COLLECTIVE FORMATION
In our agent-based network model of dynamic collective formation, agents are initially connected to each other in a network (this can be seen as them being relatively located in an abstract space). However, agents are only able to interact with each other via common collectives or when forming new collectives. Agents' network connections also change when they enter and leave groups. Although each agent can only directly interact with its immediate neighbours, agents separated by more than one degree can still form part of the same collective via a common agent-node and an agent can participate in more than one collective at any given time. Conversely, an agent's network of connections changes as a function of its group memberships; if two agents no longer share any groups, they become disconnected, and if two unconnected agents belong to the same group, they form a connection.
At each point in time, the sets of agents participating in collectives is selected depending on the relative costs and benefits of interaction to potential members. Heterogeneity is modelled by differences agents' cost and benefit parameters, which also determine the payoff values when they participate in a group interaction. For each agent-group interaction, a payoff matrix is dynamically generated as a function of the agent's cost and benefit parameter values and the collective's cost and benefit parameter values.
The system can be described by the three-tuple, (A, N, G), where:
• A = a 0 , ..., a m is the set of agents;
• N = {(a r , a s )} is a set of edges representing the connections between agents; • G = g 0 , ..., g p is the set of collectives, where each collective g j consists of a set of members M j = m 0 , ..., m q , M j ⊆ A (this is equivalent to a hypergraph relation between more than two agents). This section outlines the main decision elements of the model, which include respectively (i) group formation; (ii) leaving and joining groups; and (iii) modifying the social network.
A. Dynamically generated payoff matrices
In our model, decisions and outcomes are based on payoff matrices which are dynamically generated by agents when they interact with collectives. The values in the matrices are determined by both agent and collective parameters. Each member agent m k and collective g j has a benefit (γ) parameter and a cost (β) parameter. Both agents and collectives also have a resource variable δ. In the case of agents, δ i can be seen to represent the a resource quantity (e.g. of time, energy, money) which constrains the number of interactions a i can participate in. For the collective g j , δ j is taken to be the mean of members' δ. Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the dynamic generation of payoff matrices. Schematic representation of agent-group interaction. The group is represented by the dashed circle grouping the three agents (this can be equivalently represented in hypergraph and graph forms). Each agents payoff matrix and the collectives payoff matrix with respect to that agent is dynamically generated by the β and γ values of the groups current members.
The agent's benefit and cost parameters, respectively β i and γ i , remain unchanged through the system's evolution (initialised to random values between 0.0 and 1.0). On the other hand, as in the case of δ j , a collective g j 's benefit and cost parameters, β j and γ j , are the means of member β and γ values.
In a given member-group interaction between member m k and group g j , the payoff matrix for m k is calculated as in Equation 1 and the payoff matrix for g j is calculated as in Equation 2. It should be noted that even in the case where the member or collective 'wins' (i.e. (β k − β j ) and β j − β k ), the payoff can still be negative so that the interaction outcome simply minimises the loss that could have been incurred in the interaction. In our study, the outcomes of interactions are determined at random, with each cell in the matrix having an equal probability of being selected.
B. Group formation
Groups are formed by agents whose resource value δ is greater than 0. The agent a i evaluates each of his neighbours in turn to determine whether or not they are able to join the group. A neighbour a k is selected to join the group if the following two conditions are met:
1) The resource value of neighbour a k , δ k > 0; and 2) The agent a i would receive a net benefit from the interaction if both cooperate (top left cell of the payoff matrix), i.e.
C. Leaving and joining groups
An agent joins a group when recruited by another agent, as described above in Section II-B.
On the other hand, an agent a i may leave a group g j either because it no longer has sufficient resources to participate. i.e. δ <= 0 or because it would incur a net cost from participation even when the group is 'cooperating', i.e.
D. Network evolution in response to group membership
At the end of each time step, the agent evaluates its current set of neighbours in relation to its current set of group memberships. If the neighbour is not participating in any of the same groups, it is disconnected. On the other hand, if any of the members of the agent's current set of groups is not yet a neighbour, it is connected.
III. MEASURES OF FREE-LOADING
With respect to our model (as outlined in Section II), an agent a i is free-loading in an interaction π ij with a group g j when the payoff γ ai to a i is greater than the payoff γ gj to the group after all agent-group interactions are evaluated in a given execution step.
We measure free-loading at three levels. 1) For each agent in the system, we measure the proportion of interactions in which the agent a i is free-loading (f ai ). The mean, standard deviation, moment skewness, and kurtosis of all the system's m agents' free-loading proportions are then evaluated to give compact representations of the magnitude and distribution of the strategy's agent-level dominance. 2) At the group level, we measure the proportion of member-group interactions which are free-loading interactions from the member's perspective. 3) At the global level, we measure the overall proportion of free-loading interactions over time. These are defined in Table I . With respect to the definitions, the following notation is used. Given that the totality of interactions in the system is represented by the set Π = {π 0 , ...., π x } and its enumeration is denoted n:
The enumeration of Π j is denoted n j ; • The totality of free-loading interactions in the system is denoted P hi = {φ 0 , ..., φ y } (Φ ⊂ Π). The enumeration of Φ is denoted n Φ ; ; • The set of free-loading interactions belonging to an agent a i is denoted Φ i = φ i0 , ..., φ iy (Φ i ⊂ Φ). The enumeration of Φ i is denoted n iΦ ; ; • The set of free-loading interactions belonging to a group g j is denoted Φ j = φ j0 , ..., φ jy (Φ j ⊂ Φ). The enumeration of Φ j is denoted n jΦ ; ; In Section IV, we show how different initial network toplogies give rise to systems differing in these measures.
σ(f A) and σ(f G) give us an indication of the spread of free-riding rates among agents and groups respectively, while kt(f A), ktF G, sk(f A), sk(f G) describe the shape of the distribution. The kurtosis measures kt(f A) and ktF G indicate the height and sharpness of the peak of the distribution, with higher values indicating higher and sharper peaks. The skewness measures sk(f A), sk(f G) indicate the asymmetry of a distribution, with the magnitude of the measure indicating the degree of asymmetry and the sign of the measure indicating the direction (if the value is positive, the distribution is positively skewed while a negative value indicates a negatively skewed distrbution.
IV. FINDINGS: THE IMPORTANCE OF INITIAL NETWORK TOPOLOGY AT DIFFERENT LEVELS
This section presents the main findings of our study, which involve analysing the relationship between initial topology and free-loading rates at the systemic, collective and agent levels (as defined in Section III). For each network topology, we ran 5 simulations, each consisting of 500 time steps. The values reported are the mean of the values from across the set of simulations since for each condition, there was reliable convergence (small standard errors).
A. Network Topologies
In this study, we considered representatives of six types initial network topologies: 1) Uniform Random (U R), where the number k i of neighbours each agent a i has (degree) is a constant C and each neighbour n x ∈ N i is selected at random. 
f j : Proportion of group's interactions in which members have been free-loading
Mean of groups members' free-loading
kt(f G): Kurtosis of group members' free-loading
sk(f G): Moment Skewness of group members' free-loading
f S : Global proportion of interactions that are freeloading 3) Uniform Cost-Benefit Biased (U CB), where the number k i of neighbours each agent has is a constant C and the net cost-benefit (β x −γ x ) of the neighbours are closest to the net cost-benefit β i −γ i of the agent than are net costbenefit of any other agents in the system, i.e. |(β i −γ i )− (β x − γ x )| give the lowest values. (This can be seen to represent the clustering of agents with similar capacities and/or propensities to contribute to a group, something which is often desirable in cooperative activities.) 4) Preferential Random (P R), where the probability that one agent a i will become connected with another agent a j is proportional to k j , as based on the Barabasi-Albert algorithm [11] . 5) Preferential by resource (P Re), where the probability that one agent a i attaches to another a j is proportional to the absolute difference between their resource variables, |δ i − δ x |. 6) Preferential by net cost-benefit (P CB), where the probability that one agent a i attaches to another a j is proportional to the absolute difference between their net cost-benefit, |(β i − γ i ) − (β x − γ x )|. These can be treated either as six independent conditions or as topologies described using the two dimensions of homogeneity (HOM ) (i.e. U networks in which each agent had the same number of neighbours versus P r networks generated by preferential attachment) and neighbour choice (i.e. R: random, Re: by resource quantity, CB: by net cost-benefit). Table II shows the overall free-loading rates for each of the conditions. Although the differences between them appeared small in numerical terms, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) returned a significant difference (F = 5.23, p = 0.002). We suspected this was largely due to the U CB condition, which had the largest free-loading proportion; this was confirmed as when we removed the value, the F value was much lower (F = 1.038, p = 412). It should also be emphasised that even if differences appear small in numerical terms, it is not valid to conclude that they would be small in real-world terms since the scale is arbitrary (consider, for example, the small percentage of genes which account for all within-species variation).
B. Global free-loading rates
We then considered the interaction between the original network's homogeneity (HOM ) and the choice of neighbours (CH). A two-way ANOVA between H and CH returned significant F values (at the p = 0.05 level) both for the two factors (F HOM = 6.59, p = 0.02; F CH = 3.75, p = 0.04) and for interaction between the two factors (F HOM xCH = 6.03, p = 0.01). Table III shows the group-level free-riding statistics, as defined in Table I . he histograms in Figure 3 show the distributions of free-loading rates for the different topologies to give a visual representation to the measures. At the group level, the results differed greatly for different initial network topologies. Both one-way and two-way analyses of variance returned significant results for all four measures, as summarised in Table IV . It is immediately obvious that the results for the P R condition are qualitatively different from those from the other conditions. Unlike the other conditions, where the distributions of free-riding rate are strongly negatively skewed (indicating that a majority of groups had free-loading rates greater than the mean), the skM om(f G) value for P R is highly positive (1.34). The mean µ(f G) is also much lower than under the other conditions. D. Free-loading as an emergent strategy at the agent level Table V shows the agent-level free-loading measures, as defined in Table I . The histograms in Figure 3 show the distributions of free-loading rates for the different topologies to give a visual representation to the measures. Both one-way and two-way analyses of variance returned significant results for all four measures, suggesting groups differ significantly. This is summarised in Table VI . Apart from the one-way ANOVA and the independent effects in the two-way ANOVA for sk(f A), all other measures differed significantly and there was interaction between HOM and CH. 
C. Group-level free-loading
µ(f G) σ(f G) kt(f G) sk(f G) U R 0µ(f G), STANDARD DEVIATION σ(f G), KURTOSIS kt(f G) AND SKEWNESS sk(f G) OF FREE-LOADING RATES AT THE GROUP LEVEL. STANDARD ERRORS ARE GIVEN IN PARENTHESES. µ(f G) σ(f G) kt(f G) sk(f G)
E. Associations between free-loading and other factors
As well as considering the occurrence of free-loading at different levels, we also studied the associations between free-loading and other factors to try to identify some of the mechanisms underlying the differences between free-loading rates.
At the group level, we also evaluated the correlations between group size (the number of members) and free-riding rate (r mG−f G ). Again, the result for P R was substantially different (r mG−f G = 0.94) from the values under the other conditions. Closer analysis reveals that there is a strong negative association between mean group free-loading rate µ(f G) and r mG−f G (r = −0.94 * ). In other words, when lower free-riding rates are associated with strong associations between group size and free-loading, and higher free-loading rates are associated with weaker associations between group size and free-riding.
At the agent level, significant positive correlations between number of other group memberships and free-loading rate were observed for all topologies, with the weakest association being found in the P R condition, although a second-order analysis did not reveal a more geeneral relationship.No linear association was found between free-loading rate and agents' number of neighbours (there was also less convergence among simulations under the same condition, as indicated by the relatively high standard errors).
V. DISCUSSION
While it is obvious that prevalence of the secondary interaction strategy of free-riding has negative consequences and threatens the viability of resources shared by a collective, this is not the case free-loading (as defined in this study) because the resources are inextricably linked to the group members. For this reason, the viability of the collective is not dependent on anything other than the benefits the members are able to derive from interactions with the collective. Having said this, free-loading can be seen as a measure of inequality in member contribution to a group and hence be seen to be undesirable. TABLE VIII  TABLE SHOWING THE RANKS OF THE DIFFERENT TOPOLOGIES  ACCORDING TO FREE-LOADING RATE (LOWEST FIRST) .
The findings presented in Section IV suggest that the initial topology can be crucial in determining the free-loading rate. Table VIII ranks the different topologies according to freeloading rate at the three different levels. Although P R (network generated using the Barabasi-Albert algorithm) performs best (in terms of minimising free-loading rate) at the global systemic and group levels, it results in higher agent-level free-loading rates. One explanation for this is that because the P R network has a power law degree distribution (i.e. highly heterogeneous neighourhoods), the initial group sizes will also be highly heterogeneous and there will be some groups that are disproportionately large. Since neighbourhood choice is random, the agents with low net cost-benefit that find themselves in large groups will be able to remain in these groups and hence continue to free-load even though at the group level, their free-loading does not make much difference. This is consistent with the observation that larger organisations or teams tend to contain more weak members [12] .
Since in this study we considered only the effect of initial network topology on overall rates of free-loading, we were not able to more thoroughly address the deeper question of what role a given initial network topology plays in determining subsequent network topologies and how a given network topology in general relates to the rate of free-loading. This will be the subject of a future study.
It should also be emphasised that the model used in this study considers collective formation and free-loading in a highly stylised and abstracted fashion. In real-world systems, there are many other factors at play when individuals decide to join, leave and contribute to groups. As with any stylised model, these factors need to be seriously taken into account and their effects empirically studied before any generalisations from the model can be made (if at all).
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduced a novel agent-based network model of dynamic collective formation based on a gametheoretic framework in which the formation of collectives and the participation of agents in collectives is determined by the relative costs and benefits to agents. Using this model, we studied the effects of initial network topology on the contextdependent phenomenon of free-loading (to be distinguished from free-riding) at three levels (i) as an emergent dominant interaction strategy at the agent level; (ii) as the cost-benefit imbalances between collective members; and (iii) as a systemic phenomenon.
Our findings can be summarised as follows:
• At the global level, the highest rates of free-loading occurred in systems initialised with regular neighbourhood sizes where agents with similar net cost-benefit parameter values are located closest to each other. An interaction effect was also found between network homogeneity and neighbour choice.
• At the group level, Barabasi-Albert topology initialised systems had substantially lower free-loading rates than did systems initialised with the other topologies. There was also a stronger association between group size and free-loading rate for this topology than for the others.
• At the agent level, Barabasi-Albert topology initialised systems again differed substantially from those initialised with the other topologies in the correlation between freeloading and the number of other group memberships a member has. In this case, the association was significantly weaker than for the other topologies.
• We also found that free-loading rate at the group level was positively associated with group size, but that this effect was weaker with higher free-loading rates, suggesting the contribution of other factors. There was also a positive association between free-loading rate at the agent level and agents' number of group memberships. Although free-loading can be viewed negatively in terms of 'hiding' weaker individuals, if encouraged in the right circumstances, it also provides a powerful means by which one set of individuals can benefit significantly at relatively low cost to another set of individuals. The model and findings presented here provide a basis for further studying the fundamental relationships between network topologies and free-loading. This would provide a solid foundation for 'engineering' systems, organisations or teams in which free-loading is more or less prevalent.
